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The chilling effect of [the] loss of privacy is an undesirable
incentive to conform to societal norms rather than assert one's
individuality. Ultimately, what is lost is not only the private
emotional releases we all need but, most importantly, the
creativity that leads to human achievement.
Privacy makes possible individuality, and thus, freedom.
It allows us to cope with the larger world, knowing there is a
place where we can be by ourselves, doing as we please without
recrimination.
-Robert S. Peck'
* B.S. (business) Indiana University-Bloomington, 1993; candidate for J.D. Indiana
University-Bloomington, 1996. Thanks to Charles for his unwavering love and support.
1. Robert S. Peck, The Right to be Left Alone, 15 HuM. RTs. 26, 27 (1987).
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INTRODUCTION
As society becomes increasingly automated, individual privacy is
threatened in ways unimaginable only a few years ago. The pervasive use
of computers has enhanced society's ability to collect, store, retrieve,
process, and disseminate data on individuals, quite often without the
individual's knowledge or consent. Privacy laws in the United States have
not kept pace with the technological developments of the past twenty years.
In fact, virtually nothing protects individuals from having their private lives
peered into via computer. This Note addresses the threat to individual
privacy inherent in the collection, processing, and dissemination of personal
information by private sector organizations and individuals. This Note does
not examine in-depth the regulation and control of government collection
and use of personal data,2 nor does it survey currently existing constitu-
tional privacy rights such as those recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut3
and Roe v. Wade.4 Specifically, this Note examines the legal use of
personal information often collected, compiled, and disseminated by private
individuals or entities, without the consent or knowledge of the person the
information concerns.
Information privacy is the right to control how information about
oneself is used by those to whom it is disclosed. Congress needs to create
a right to information privacy. Current protections are either inadequate or
simply nonexistent. Neither the courts nor the legislatures have addressed
the recent uses of technology that invade personal privacy. Regulations
control governmental use of personal information,5 but very little
legislation has been enacted to address the use of personal information by
the private sector.6 Comprehensive federal legislation is necessary to curb
2. See generally Gary R. Clouse, The Constitutional Right to Withhold Private
Information, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 536 (1982); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1974); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV.
737 (1989); Bruce D. Goldstein, Comment, Confidentiality and Dissemination of Personal
Information: An Examination of State Laws Governing Data Protection, 41 EMORY L.J.
1185 (1992); E. Maria Grace, Note, Privacy vs. Convenience: The Benefits and Drawbacks
of Tax System Modernization, 47 FED. CoMM. L.J. 409 (1994); John Shattuck, Comment,
In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, Computer-Matching, and Privacy
in the United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991 (1984).
3. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. See The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994); The Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (1978).
6. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, ch. 6, see. 601, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1681a-1681t (1988)); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988
(also known as the Federal Videotape Privacy Protection Act), 102 Stat. 3195 (codified as
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the abusive collection and use of personal information.
The right to information privacy has not been recognized within the
protections afforded by the United States Constitution. However, an
express right to privacy exists in a number of state constitutions.7 Yet,
acknowledgment of constitutional protections would be ineffective as any
such protection would only apply against the government and currently, the
greatest threat to personal privacy exists in the private sector.
Current tort law is unhelpful, as courts have thus far been reluctant
to recognize an invasion of privacy cause of action that includes dissemina-
tion of individual data without consent.8 This problem exists partially
because the legal system has been unable to develop a coherent and widely
accepted definition of privacy. Furthermore, since the publication of Dean
William L. Prosser's framework for privacy torts in 1960,9 the legal
community has accepted the fact that four distinct privacy torts exist, and
an information privacy tort does not fit neatly within any of those
preexisting frameworks.
Aside from the definitional difficulties encountered by a common-law
tort remedy for a violation of information privacy, a purely logistical
concern exists in adopting a common law remedy. It takes years for a
single case to move through the court system to establish a precedent upon
which lower courts can rely. Furthermore, the various circuit courts have
differing views on privacy. Therefore, a uniform rule governing informa-
tion privacy would not develop for some time. Technology is changing too
rapidly for the court system to develop effective parameters within which
information brokers are able to operate.
Furthermore, contractual solutions alone are inadequate to deal with
the invasion of privacy experienced when personal information is
disseminated without consent. Contractual solutions burden the data subject
with the task of tracking personal information already collected and then
trying to stop its dissemination, rather than requiring the broker who
wishes to sell that information to first obtain consent for its release.
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988)); Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 108 Stat.
2099 to 2102 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994)); Cable Communications Policy Act,
98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
However, all of this legislation deals with only a small niche of the privacy problem and
is inadequate to deal with the problem on the scale to which it has escalated.
7. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. U1, § 10;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
8. See, e.g., Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
9. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). The four torts are
appropriation, false light, intrusion, and the public disclosure of private facts.
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Finally, legislative reactions to date have been inadequate, focusing
only on immediate concerns and failing to address the effect that dissemina-
tion of personal information has on society. This demonstrates the need for
uniform legislation that controls the collection and dissemination of
information, the acquisition of individual consent before the dissemination
of information, and damages that may be assessed against violators.
Part I of this Note will examine what is meant by information privacy
and how personal information is currently used by people other than those
to whom it was disclosed. Part II will discuss whether a current right to
information privacy exists. Part III assesses whether current law-consti-
tutional, tort, contractual, and legislative-is adequate to deal with
invasions into personal privacy. Finally, Part IV proposes solutions that
will afford the same level of protection to all who are affected by the
invasion of information privacy.
I. INFORMATION PRIVACY
Imagine the horror Mallory Hughes of Florida experienced when he
received the following letter from evangelist Oral Roberts, with whom Mr.
Hughes had no previous contact:
Mallory, I am your Partner and your friend, and because
I am so close to you in spirit, I feel I can say something very
personal to you.... Mallory, it's time for you to get out from
under a load of debt, that financial bondage that... makes you
feel like you have nowhere to turn. The devil tells you, "You've
made your bed of debt, now you've got to lie in it. You're going
to be paying on your bills for the rest of your life.... You're
doomed with debt!"
Mallory, does the horror of these thoughts keep you awake
at night? The burden, oh the burden, sometimes is too much to
bear... If you could just suddenly receive a big lump sum of
money, all your problems would be over.
Well Mallory, I don't have a magical answer for your pile
of bills and financial bondage. But I do have a miraculous
answer, direct from the throne of God to your home."
The letter went on to encourage Mr. Hughes to send $100 to Oral Roberts
so he could intercede with God on Mr. Hughes's behalf." Oral Roberts
purchased Mr. Hughes's name from a databank that targets those suspected
of being in financial difficulty. Although Mr. Hughes was admittedly in a
financial bind, he was understandably upset that a perfect stranger was able
10. JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, PRIVACY FOR SALE: How COMPUTERIZATION HAS MADE
EvERYONE'S PRIVATE LIFE AN OPEN SECRET 23-24 (1992).
11. Id. at 24.
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to peer into his private life.
Margaret Davis of Burbank, California, had a similar experience.
Upon discovering she was pregnant, Ms. Davis ordered a maternity
catalog. Shortly thereafter she began receiving more catalogs, free baby-
related product samples, and solicitations to purchase baby-related services.
Unfortunately, Ms. Davis had a miscarriage. However, the barrage of
information and solicitations did not end. Despite her efforts to contact the
solicitors by phone and letter, she continued to be inundated with mail and
offers she did not want. She received phone calls close to the time her baby
would have been due congratulating her on her new arrival, and she
received birthday cards for the following few years. This experience was
so upsetting for Ms. Davis that her husband had to open all the mail
received by the couple and screen all phone calls.12
Such stories are abundant in modem society. Almost all business
organizations of every conceivable size have some type of automated data
system. Information that was formerly kept on paper and stored in filing
cabinets is now stored in computers. This means that the most intimate,
personal information about nearly every American adult is now recorded
and preserved digitally. Add to this the fact that every time a consumer
writes a check, uses a credit card, presents a grocery store check-cashing
card, makes an ATM transaction, fills out a warranty card, applies for a
loan, calls an 800- or 900-number, or engages in any other activity that
leaves a data trail, the consumer reveals personal information that is
permanently stored in computerized databanks. Almost any decent hacker
with a computer, modem, and telephone can access the computerized
record of this information.13 Armed with as little information as an
individual's Social Security number, address, or checking account number,
a total stranger can access the vast amount of personal information stored
in computerized databanks. 14
A. The Risk Involved
The threat from the collection of personal information used to be
relatively innocuous. Prior to the technological revolution, it was relatively
12. R.J. Ignelzi, Mail and Telejunk: U.S. Marketers Have Your Number; YourAge and
Shoe Size, Too, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRi., July 4, 1995, at El, E4.
13. Vic Sussman, Policing Cyberspace, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD RaP., Jan. 23, 1995,
at 55, 57. See also Pat Shellenbarger, Privacy Pirates: The Curtain's Open, The Blind Is
Up and Any Peeping Tom, Dick or Harry Can Look into Your Life Through a Computer
Window, GRAND RAPIDS PREss, Mar. 19, 1995, at J1.
14. See generally Sussman, supra note 13, at 55; Peter F. Eder, Privacy on Parade:
Your Secrets For Sale!, THE FuTuRIST, July-Aug. 1994, at 38, 39.
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impossible for any one individual or organization to collect information
from the many places it existed. However, the advent of the computer has
made it both inexpensive and easy for anyone with a minimum amount of
computer knowledge to compile information from many different sources.
With the assistance of computer-matching programs, information can be
gathered from many different sources, run through a computer, and
assembled moments later into a complete and detailed personal dossier on
virtually any individual. An individual or organization need only contact
one of many companies specializing in compiling databases to obtain
personal information. 5 Information can also be obtained by directly
subscribing to the services offered by credit bureaus. For a fee, usually
between $400 and $500, those with an appropriate need may obtain a
password that allows access via personal computers to the vast amount of
information collected and compiled by credit bureaus. 6 Then, by using
matching software, the computer user is able to compile information gained
from different sources and construct detailed and complete personal
dossiers on individuals without their knowledge or consent.
The computerized information compiled in such dossiers is accessed
by an array of individuals and organizations. These include businesses,
private investigators, insurance companies, employers, landlords, and
doctors. As technology becomes more sophisticated, it becomes easier to
detail the lives of individuals-their location at any given moment, what
type of groceries they purchased, what books and magazines they read,
where and with whom they travel, and whether they have ever sued a
doctor or filed a worker's compensation claim. Virtually every activity in
every person's life will be recorded in the near future.
Currently, most people are unaware of the type and amount of
information collected about them. For example, grocery stores are now
able to collect information about which items individuals purchase and the
frequency with which consumers shop." If customers use grocery store
check-cashing cards, credit cards, or virtually any other cashless method
of payment, the store then has a record of the customers and what they
purchased. This information can then be used to target coupon or other
promotional mailings to the customers.' 8 This in itself seems relatively
harmless, however, the information is used for other purposes. Insurance
15. See Schellenbarger, supra note 13, at J1.
16. See ROTHFEDER, PRIVACY FOR SALE, supra note 10, at 18-19.
17. Sue Landry, A Private Matter? Don't Count on it., ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec.
14, 1994, at 14A. See also Susan E. Fisher, What Do Computers Know About You?, PC
WK, Feb. 11, 1991, at 156.
18. Fisher, supra note 17, at 156.
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companies can purchase this information on a potential insured to determine
a person's dietary habits-whether the person purchases red meat,
cigarettes, or alcohol-to determine if the insured may be a greater risk to
the company. An insurance company can combine this information with
medical records that can be obtained from the Medical Information Bureau
(MIB) 9 which has data on 15 million people.' The result is a very
complete picture of a person's lifestyle, regardless of whether or not the
information is accurate. Furthermore, although the information collected
concerns some of the most intimate details of personal life, individuals may
be unaware of its existence and, therefore, unable to correct any misinfor-
mation contained in these records.2'
The majority of this information is contained in the databases of credit
reporting agencies. ' TRW, Equifax, and Trans Union, the three largest,
reportedly have 500 million records on an estimated 160 million people.'
It is estimated that information on each of the 160 million people is
transmitted between computers an average of five times a day.' Federal
and local governments are the largest gatherers of information in the
country. The United States government reportedly has an average of fifteen
files on every American.' In total, this adds up to approximately five
billion records that describe the personal lives of Americans.' Although
errors abound in computerized data,27 the mere fact that the information
19. Jeffrey Rothfeder, Dangerous Things Strangers Know About You, McCALL's, Jan.
1994, at 88, 94. Medical records are not private. The MIB is an insurance consortium that
collects information regarding Americans and Canadians from physician and hospital
records. No federal law restricts the dissemination of medical records to anyone who
requests them. Id. at 94.
20. Shellenbarger, supra note 13, at J1.
21. Consider, for example, the story of Tommy Robinson, a 1990 Arkansas GOP
gubernatorial candidate who would have faced then-Governor Bill Clinton for the state's top
job had he won the primary election. During a physical examination, Robinson told his
doctor that he consumed approximately one pint of bourbon a week. The doctor
inadvertently recorded that Robinson consumed one pint of liquor a day. Robinson's
incorrect medical records were printed in the Arkansas Democrat, ruining his reputation.
He was defeated in the primary election. ROTHFEDER, PRIVACY FOR SALE, supra note 10,
at 175-76.
22. See generally Eder, supra note 14, at 38.
23. Rothfeder, Dangerous Things Strangers Know About You, supra note 19, at 90.
24. Steven Bibas, A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 591, 593 (1994). See also Eder, supra note 14, at 38.
25. Richard Lacayo, Nowhere To Hide, TIME, Nov. 11, 1991, at 34, 39.
26. Bibas, supra note 24, at 593.
27. Approximately 35 percent of those who pay to see their credit reports find that their
report contains someone else's data. Joshua D. Blackman, A Proposal for Federal
Legislation Protecting Informational Privacy Across the Private Sector, 9 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 431, 434 (1993).
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is computerized makes it appear more authoritative and the results are
rarely, if ever, questioned by those using it.' Furthermore, because of the
relatively minor cost of storing information on a computer disc, informa-
tion is kept much longer than its useful life. Therefore, important decisions
may be made based on outdated, if not inaccurate, information.29
B. The Effect of the National Information Infrastructure on
Information Privacy
The collection and exchange of information will become even easier
and more pervasive if the Clinton Administration's vision of the National
Information Infrastructure (NII) comes to fruition.3' The Clinton Adminis-
tration, through the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration's (NTIA) Agenda for Action, has called for the connection
of the nation's businesses, residences, and schools with advanced high-
speed networks." Although the Adminstration realizes that in order for
the NII to succeed it must be trustworthy and secure,32 there is no
mention of how this security should be accomplished. In fact, the Agenda
for Action calls for "[a]pplications and software that allow users to access,
manipulate, organize, and digest the proliferating mass of information that
the NII's facilities will put at their fingertips,"33 and further imagines a
network that is "sufficiently 'open' and interactive so that users can...
exchange information among themselves. "'4 The NTIA has called for
comments regarding the privacy issues relating to private-sector use of
personal information which is associated with the Nil, 35 but no record of
these comments has yet been published.
II. THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION PRIVACY
Is there a right to information privacy? In light of the current lack of
legislation in this area, the answer to this question is a resounding "no."
One reason that society has not explicitly recognized a fundamental right
28. Rothfeder, Dangerous Things Strangers Know About You, supra note 19, at 88.
29. Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the CommercialDissemination
of Personal Information, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1987).
30. The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025
(1993).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 49,025 and 49,029 (acknowledging the threats to privacy inherent in the
gathering, sending, and receiving of personal information).
33. Id. at 49,026.
34. Id. at 49,029.
35. Inquiry on Privacy Issues Relating to Private Sector Use of Telecommunications-
Related Personal Information, 59 Fed. Reg. 6842 (1994).
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to privacy is the failure, or inability, to coherently define this right. In
1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis defined privacy simply as "the
right to be let alone."36 Since the publication of Warren and Brandeis's
seminal article on privacy, the right to privacy has been defined in many
different ways. Privacy has been described as "encompass[ing] concerns
about fair and reasonable information practices as well as confidenti-
ality,"37 and as the ability of "individuals and organizations . . . to deter-
mine for themselves what they want to keep private and what they want-or
need-to reveal." 38 Additionally, privacy has been found to encompass
"the unitary concept of separation of self from society," 39 "the right to
control the flow of information about oneself,"' and the "claim of
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others."4
Because a single definition or concept of privacy has not evolved, it is
difficult to determine exactly when the right to privacy has been violated.
Information privacy is a subset of the larger concept of privacy.
Generally, personal information is originally gathered for a legitimate
purpose, such as processing a loan or credit card application, filling out a
warranty card, or applying for health or life insurance. However, once this
information is collected, it is frequently sold to others for mailing lists or
marketing schemes, to employers who use the information to make
employment decisions, to insurance companies for use in determining
whether an applicant is a good risk, and to landlords who want to know if
a potential tenant has damaged past rentals or paid the rent on time. Even
anti-abortion advocates and pro-choice groups send solicitations to
consumers who have recently purchased home pregnancy tests.42 Until
society determines that our individual right to privacy outweighs the needs
of businesses and others to pry into personal lives without consent, the lack
of information privacy will continue to be a problem.
36. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890).
37. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: AFortress orFrontierfor
Individual Rights?, 44 FED. CoMM. L.J. 195, 201 (1992).
38. Alan F. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the
1970's: Part if-Balancing the Conflicting Demands of Privacy, Disclosure, and
Surveillance, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1210 (1966).
39. John T. Soma & Richard A. Wehmhoeffer, A Legal and Technical Assessment of
the Effect of Computers on Privacy, 60 DENV. L.J. 449, 450 (1983).
40. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & David W. Leebron, Foreword: Privacy and
Information Technology, 2 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 495, 496-97 (1986).
41. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). This definition of privacy is
the one at greatest risk in the area of information privacy.
42. Blackman, supra note 27, at 433.
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III. CURRENT PROTECTIONS
A. Constitutional Protections
The phrase "right to privacy" is invariably mentioned in tandem with
the phrase "constitutional right." However, the term "right to privacy"
does not appear anywhere in the United States Constitution. The United
States Supreme Court has found that the right to privacy emanates from the
penumbras of the articles of the Bill of Rights in certain circumstances.'
In 1977, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Whalen v. Roe,'
which held that medical patients' rights to privacy were outweighed by the
government's need to publish their names in a database that contained
information on persons who had been legally prescribed narcotics.4' The
Court determined that a state had a legitimate interest in the collection of
the information and that the collection of the data did not "establish an
invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. "
However, in dicta, the majority stated that it was "not unaware of the
threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal
information in computerized data banks."47 The majority further stated
that it understood that much of the information collected is "personal in
character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed. The right
to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied
by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted
disclosures."' The Court then concluded that while sometimes the duty
to avoid disclosures arises from the Constitution, it was not deciding a
"question which might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of
accumulated private data whether intentional or unintentional or by a
system that did not contain comparable security provisions."41
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan made clear that the Whalen v. Roe
decision was based on the fact that the reporting system was a legitimate
state interest and that the system contained appropriate safeguards against
unauthorized disclosures. He further expressed his concerns that "[t]he
central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase
43. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
44. Whalen, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
45. Id. at 603-04.
46. Id. at 606.
47. Id. at 605.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 605-06.
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the potential for abuse of that information, and [he was] not prepared to say
that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb
on such technology."" Despite Justice Brennan's explicit recognition that
changing technology may necessitate a reexamination of this issue by the
Court, this issue has not surfaced for reconsideration.
Critics of a right to information privacy have raised the First
Amendment as a potential defense against any declaration of a constitu-
tional right to information privacy. 1 These critics usually include
businesses engaged in the sale of personal information, and marketers who
find the detailed information available about individuals a valuable tool in
promoting and selling their products. 2 They argue that the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of free speech is superior to any information privacy
rights of the data subject. Those with an interest in the for-profit dissemina-
tion of personal information have a legitimate First Amendment right in
free speech. However, the Court has held that speech which does nothing
more than propose a commercial transaction has a lower value and,
therefore, can be subject to regulation. 3 The Supreme Court has held that
commercial speech rights are in a "subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values"' and that commercial speech is less likely to be
deterred by regulation than is core political speech.55
In fact, it has been determined that credit reports do not address a
public concern and are, therefore, not protected by the First Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court held, in a plurality opinion, that in order for
commercial speech to be afforded full protection under the First Amend-
ment, it must address a matter of public concern, and the "petitioner's
credit report concerns no public issue. It was speech solely in the individual
interest of the speaker and its specific business audience." 6 In this case,
Dun & Bradstreet released an incorrect credit report to a client. Based on
this report, the client denied credit to Greenmoss Builders. The report
stated that Greenmoss had filed bankruptcy, which was untrue. Thus, the
50. Id. at 607.
51. Bob Geske, Protecting Our Privacy Through the Electronic Keyhole of the 90's,
Businesses are Peeping into Our Lives as Never Before, VIGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.),
Oct. 13, 1993, at C1. See also Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The
Warren & Brandeis Tort is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1219,
1225 (1994).
52. Geske, supra note 51, at Cl.
53. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983).
54. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
55. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Credit Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976).
56. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985).
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Supreme Court, in holding that credit reports are not the subject of public
controversy, established a basis upon which to protect the privacy of purely
private information of no public concern.
The Constitution does not provide a basis to protect information
privacy because it applies only to the actions of the U.S. government and
to actions of state governments as incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment. It has no force with respect to actions of private actors.
Therefore, use of constitutional principles-although theoretically
feasible-would not solve the problem of what to do when a private
individual or organization has collected and disseminated personal
information about an individual without that individual's knowledge or
consent.
Many states have expressly recognized the right to privacy in their
state constitutions. 57 Others have recognized the right to privacy in
conjunction with the right within the home to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures,"8 similar to the rights guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. California has recognized a privacy
right that exceeds the right to privacy recognized under the Constitution of
the United States.59 The legislative declaration and findings of this
amendment state that:
The right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right
... and that all individuals have a right of privacy in informa-
tion pertaining to them. The legislature further makes the
following findings:
(a) The right to privacy is being threatened by the indis-
criminate collection, maintenance, and dissemination of
personal information and the lack of effective laws and
legal remedies.
(b) The increasing use of computers and other sophisticated
information technology has greatly magnified the potential
risk to individual privacy that can occur from the mainte-
nance of personal information.
(c) In order to protect the privacy of individuals, it is
necessary that the maintenance and dissemination of
personal information be subject to strict limits6
57. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
58. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
59. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among
these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONSI. art. I,
§ 1 (amended 1972).
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.1 (West 1985).
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In 1976, a California appellate court held that "[p]rivacy is protected
not merely against state action; it is considered an inalienable right which
may not be violated by anyone." 61 In so holding, the California courts
took a step the U. S. Supreme Court has not taken-holding private actors
to a constitutional standard of behavior.
B. Common-Law Protections
In 1960, Dean William L. Prosser classified the common-law tort of
invasion of privacy as "four distinct kinds of invasion of four different
interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but
otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents an
interference with the right of the plaintiff. . . 'to be let alone.'"62 Since
the publication of the Warren and Brandeis article in 1890, Dean Prosser
stated that he was not trying to define the four privacy torts but contended
that all the judicial decisions of the past forty years fit into one of the four
categories he discussed.63
The first of these four torts is "[p]ublicity which places the plaintiff
in a false light in the public eye." '' The second tort was defined as
"[i]ntrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs."' Third, Prosser identified "[p]ublic disclosure of embarrassing
private facts about the plaintiff."' He categorized the fourth tort as
"[a]ppropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness."67 Plaintiffs have had little or no success bringing actions under
this scheme of privacy torts when the invasion is one of information
privacy. However, these torts are defined broadly enough that courts could
expand their application to the information privacy arena.
61. Porten v. University of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1976).
62. Prosser, supra note 8, at 389.
63. Although Dean Prosser said he was not trying to define the law of privacy torts, his
definitions have been almost wholly accepted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts and are
virtually the only privacy torts recognized today. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652A (1977).
64. Prosser, supra note 8, at 389. The Restatement defines this tort as "publicity that
unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
65. Prosser, supra note 8, at 389. The Restatement defines this tort as "unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A
(1977).
66. Prosser, supra note 8, at 389. The Restatement defines this tort as "unreasonable
publicity given to the other's private life." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A
(1977).
67. Prosser, supra note 8, at 389. The Restatement defines this tort as "appropriation
of the other's name or likeness." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
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In terms of information privacy, publicly placing a person in a false
light is the least helpful of the four Prosser torts, because the information
published about the individual must be untrue. Furthermore, the publisher
must recklessly disregard the matter's untruthfulness.68  Generally
speaking, the information that is bought and sold among information
brokers does not fit this pattern. The information is generally true or at
least believed to be true. Therefore, this tort is not applicable in the context
of information privacy.
"Intrusion upon a person's seclusion or solitude" is unhelpful as
well. This tort requires an unreasonable intrusion into an area in which one
has a reasonable expectation of being undisturbed.69 Unauthorized
dissemination of personal information arguably intrudes into the solitude or
private affairs of the data subject. However, the historical application of
this tort presents two major problems in the context of information privacy.
First, the intrusion must be highly offensive to the reasonable person. 0
Because information privacy is a personal matter, what may greatly offend
one person may be welcomed by another. Further, the Restatement
concludes that there is no liability for the examination of a public record.
The invasion must be of "a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown
about his person or affairs."7" Second, this tort has traditionally applied
to physical intrusions and is used to fill the gaps left by trespass law.'
Meeting the requirement of intrusion into private seclusion is a difficult test
for those complaining of an invasion of information privacy because the
disseminated information was once freely given by the data subject.
The tort of public disclosure of private facts seems, at least from the
standpoint of its title, to be exactly what is needed to protect against the
intrusion of information privacy. The Restatement defines this tort as the
dissemination of information that "would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and is not of legitimate concern to the public."'
However, this definition poses two significant problems for information
privacy. First, the information must be disseminated to the public at large.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
69. Id. at § 652B.
70. Id. at cmt. a.
71. Id. at cmt. c.
72. Prosser, supra note 8, at 392.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). According to Prosser, the
elements of this tort are: (1) the "disclosure of the private must be a public disclosure, and
not a private one"; (2) "the facts disclosed to the public must be private facts, and not
public ones"; and (3) "the matter made public must be one which would be offensive and
objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities." Prosser, supra note 8, at 393-
96.
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This means that dissemination of information to one or a few persons is not
actionable. Second, this tort applies only to a public disclosure that would
be highly offensive to the reasonable person. Offensiveness is determined
in relation to "the customs of the time and place, to the occupation of the
plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens."74 Unfortu-
nately, the custom of our times is that it is acceptable to disseminate
information about individuals without their consent. This is probably due
to a lack of knowledge on the part of the vast majority of the American
population as to what type of information is sold and for what purposes it
is used.
The proliferation of information sold to others on the grand scale
currently seen, however, may satisfy the first element of this tort. An
information broker who sells the collected personal information to a large
number of persons may well violate this tort. The problem then becomes
one of how many people need to access the information to satisfy this
element. If this element can be satisfied, and society in general becomes
aware of, and offended by, the large scale on which confidential informa-
tion is bought and sold, this tort could find new life as the protector of
information privacy.
Appropriation of name or likeness may be the most useful of
Prosser's four torts. The Restatement indicates that the interest contem-
plated here is "of the individual in the exclusive use of his own iden-
tity."'75 This is exactly what is being invaded by persons or entities who
gather and transmit data on any given individual. This information is
disseminated not to satisfy people's curiosity but to develop a personality
or character profile of a certain individual. The information can be used to
predict future behavior, grant or deny a benefit, send targeted mailings, or
for any other number of reasons that are tied directly to the individual's
behavioral characteristics.
Unfortunately, this tort traditionally has been applied almost
exclusively to cases of advertising where a public figure's name or likeness
has been used to sell a product or service that directly benefits the
defendant without the consent of the public figure.76 This tort recognizes
that public figures have an interest similar to a property right in their
names or likenesses. When information is disseminated about an individual,
a third party profits from that individual's personal property. By recogniz-
74. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
75. Id. at § 652C.
76. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
See also Graham, supra note 29, at 1412.
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ing that all individuals, not just public figures, have a property interest in
their names or likenesses, this tort easily could be expanded to include the
invasion of privacy through the dissemination of personal information.'
Applying these torts in the context of information privacy poses two
problems. First, none of them traditionally has been viewed in terms of
information privacy. There is a common attitude that an individual should
not object to the dissemination of personal information unless there is
something to hide. However, it is not the content of the information that
is offensive but the fact that the information pertaining to an individual is
disseminated without permission, and that someone else profits from the
sale of that information. However, unless the data subject can demonstrate
monetary damage as a result of the dissemination of personal information
without consent, there may be no remedy for that injury. Furthermore, the
personal distaste or anguish experienced by those whose privacy has been
invaded may not be severe enough to recover pain and suffering damages
under the common-law torts.
Second, since Dean Prosser wrote his article in 1960, there has been
virtually no change to the common-law privacy torts. If a tort does not fit
neatly within one of the four delineated causes of action, the plaintiff is
unable to recover damages. Obviously, the law has not kept pace with the
changing technology and values of modem times.
An alternative to the Prosser torts is recognition of a tort defined as
commercial dissemination of private facts.78 This tort would create
liability for the transfer of information between business entities in certain
situations that the courts deem appropriate.79 The most likely scenario
would be the unauthorized transfer of information. Jonathan Graham, the
commentator who proposed this solution, left it to the courts to determine
the quality of the information transferred.' ° However, his premise is
flawed because, regardless of the amount or quality of information
transferred, the decision to distribute personal information should always
rest with the individual concerned. If this fact were recognized, this tort
would provide a possible solution to the information privacy problem.
However, the biggest barrier to using the common law to address the
77. Invasion of privacy through the dissemination of private information recently has
been recognized as a tort by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. However, as
with the appropriation of name or likeness, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
also recognizes this right for public figures. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPE-
TITION §§ 46-49 (1995).
78. See Graham, supra note 29, at 1428.
79. Id. at 1429.
80. Id. at 1430.
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problem of information privacy is not how or whether an information
privacy tort is defined; it is the average amount of time it takes a lawsuit
to proceed through the court system. This is an almost insurmountable
barrier to the use of the common law as a tool for change in recognizing
the tort of information privacy. Furthermore, if the common law were to
be used as the sole mechanism for change, any solution would most likely
become outdated before it was even reported. Moreover, cases that settle
out of court and those that are not appealed would further hamper the
efficacy of this solution since no precedent would be established upon
which other courts could rely.
C. Contractual Protections
It has been argued that the problem of information privacy can be
solved by allowing individuals to contract with those to whom they provide
information as to what, if any, information the individual wants dissemi-
nated."1 This approach entails providing "an opt-in or opt-out clause"82
which indicates to the data gatherer whether or not the data subject wants
information already disclosed to be disseminated in the future. The penalty
for failing to provide this option clause would correspond to the prevailing
expectations of privacy in that industry. This would be determined by the
dollar amount individuals attach to their privacy under certain circum-
stances.' This premise largely rests on the assumption that the only
danger of dissemination of information comes from the information
contained in credit bureau databanks.1
This assumption fails to recognize the existence and use of the vast
number of databanks kept by people and organizations other than credit
bureaus. This solution overlooks the fact that businesses are formed with
the sole purpose of collecting data from various sources and compiling it
into detailed personal dossiers. These businesses then sell this information
to others who use it for vastly different reasons than those for which it was
originally collected.'
This premise is further flawed because it assumes that the "informa-
tion market" functions rationally from an economic standpoint. It assumes
that those with favorable credit ratings want their credit reports dissemi-
nated to businesses or individuals with which they are not anticipating
doing business. Individuals who receive stacks of junkmail and follow-up
81. Bibas, supra note 24, at 592.
82. Id. at 606.
83. Id. at 608.
84. Id. at 595.
85. See supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
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phone calls on a daily basis would probably disagree with this assumption.
This premise assumes that these individuals should want this kind of
attention because it makes credit cheaper and prices lower.86 Aside from
the fact that most people find this sort of "attention" annoying, this premise
is flawed.
Dissemination of personal information without consent does not make
credit cheaper or prices lower. Individuals with sound credit histories will
still receive inexpensive financing when they want it. Credit reporting
agencies serve a valuable function in society, and personal information
needs to be accessible to creditors to insure they are lending to those most
likely to pay them back. However, they should not be allowed to
disseminate information about individuals without written consent. The
information the creditor receives on the debtor would be just as accurate
and beneficial to both parties if it were not obtained until the debtor wanted
the creditor to obtain it. The accuracy and value of this information are not
increased as a result of obtaining it prior to any indication that the debtor
is interested in doing business with the creditor.
The contractual solution to the problem of information privacy could
work in conjunction with federal legislation setting a minimum standard of
privacy for all individuals and all information. Once legislation has been
passed, and a minimum standard of privacy has been set, an individual can
then contract away unwanted protection. This puts the burden on the person
or organization who wants to sell the information to receive consent before
doing so, rather than burdening the data subject with the task of tracking
down all personal information collected and trying to stop its dissemination.
D. Statutory Protections
Thus far, legislative action regarding information privacy has been
inadequate. This is partially because legislative responses have been
reactive instead of proactive, and because of the existence of strong groups
lobbying on behalf of businesses and credit reporting agencies. The first
reaction of federal legislators to governmental abuse of information was the
Privacy Act of 1974.Y This Act was passed in response to the Nixon
Administration's use of political opponents' tax information. However, this
legislation restricts only the federal government's actions as to the
information it collects. It has no effect on private individuals.
Congress next took action in this arena in 1978. The Right to
86. Bibas, supra note 24, at 608.
87. Privacy Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(1994)).
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Financial Privacy Act88 was enacted as a reaction to the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Miller.89 Miller held that a bank depositor has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of checks and deposit
slips held by a financial institution. It held that there can be no such
expectation without possession or ownership.90 The Financial Privacy Act
restricts governmental access to information contained in financial records
of customers of financial institutions without the consent of the customer
or proof of an appropriate subpoena, summons, or search warrant in which
the financial records in question must be reasonably described.9 Congress
further mandated that any information transferred must be for law
enforcement purposes, and the individual must be informed of any such
disclosures. 2
The first attempt by Congress to control the actions of private entities
was the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.93 This Act responded to
perceived abuses of the credit reporting industry. Congress recognized that
credit reporting bureaus had "to exercise their grave responsibilities with
fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's right to privacy. ' 'I
The legislation allows credit reporting agencies to release information to
those (1) it believes intend "to use the information in connection with a
credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be
furnished .. . or otherwise has a legitimate business need for the
information in connection with a business transaction involving the
consumer," or (2) for employment, insurance, or government benefits
issued on the basis of financial status.95 This broad definition of who is
entitled to receive information regarding consumers almost negates the
reason for the law in the first place. Virtually anyone can, and has, fit
through the broad loophole of "legitimate business need." Therefore, the
category of those eligible to receive the information collected by credit
agencies is almost limitless.
Congress again acted to protect individual privacy rights in 1988 when
88. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3697 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994)).
89. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
90. Id. at 440.
91. 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (1994).
92. Id. at §§ 3405-3407 (1994).
93. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, ch. 6, § 601, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1681a-1681t (1988)).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (1988).
95. Id. at § 1681(b)(3).
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it passed the Video Privacy Protection Act.96 This legislation was passed
in response to the Senate confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominee
Robert Bork. This Act restricts the release of information or public
dissemination regarding the videos individuals rent. 7 During Judge Bork's
confirmation hearings, records of his recent video rentals were obtained
and released to the media. Fortunately for Judge Bork, his taste in
movies-namely, Westerns and family films-was not socially stigmatic.
However, if controversial subject matter had been revealed-for example,
pornography-the situation could have been quite embarrassing for Judge
Bork. A similar provision is included in the Cable Communications Policy
Act,9" which prohibits the dissemination of information regarding the
viewing habits of cable television subscribers.
The most recent congressional response is the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act of 1994. 99 This provision, which was sponsored by Sen.
Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.), limits the access and dissemination of records held
by a state's department of motor vehicles (DMV). This legislation was
passed in response to the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer in 1989. Ms.
Schaeffer was killed by an obsessed fan who obtained her address from a
private investigator, who gained access to her address through her DMV
records. The problem with this legislation is that it contains many
loopholes. These include an exemption for private investigators, such as the
one who obtained Ms. Schaeffer's address, as well as a general provision
allowing DMVs to disclose information to outside entities-provided
drivers are given clear and conspicuous notice of possible disclosures on
license renewal forms, vehicle registrations and titles, and identification
cards. 10o
Legislative responses to the Bork confirmation hearings and the
Schaeffer murder are unfortunately typical. When evidence of a large
problem arises, Congress commonly reacts with the quickest possible
remedy. Therefore, instead of taking the opportunity to examine the entire
issue of information privacy, Congress has looked only to the problem
immediately facing it. This has resulted in solutions that are far too
shortsighted and reactionary.
96. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (also known as the Federal Videotape Privacy
Protection Act), 102 Stat. 3195 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988)).
97. Id.
98. Cable Communications Policy Act, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 551 (1994)).
99. Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 2099-2102 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2721 (1994)).
100. Id. at § 2100.
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State reaction to the problems posed by the burgeoning use and
misuse of computer technology has been equally diffuse. A few states have
passed a variety of laws but no state has passed comprehensive legislation
to curb the abuse of the invasion of information privacy. In general, states
have reacted by enacting legislation that deals broadly with the regulation
of credit bureaus, 1' information collected by insurance companies, 102
library and video records, 103 communications,' °4 and other transmission
of personal data."°5
However, because the problem of regulating the dissemination of
information is a national one, the most effective response will have to come
from the Congress. If Congress is slow to act in this area, states can fill the
gap by passing legislation protecting the rights of their citizens against the
intrusions of information sellers. The fact that the largest dealers of
information conduct business on a nationwide basis will force them to adopt
the safeguards of the state with the most protective mandates to insure that
they do not violate anyone's rights.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
Congress needs to act. Ironically, those who have opposed federal
legislation the most are those who have the most to lose if no federal
legislation is enacted. American businesses stand to lose the ability to
transfer data across foreign borders if appropriate federal legislation is not
enacted. The European Union Council of Ministers adopted the Council
Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
101. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.1, 1785.32, 1786, 1786.52 (West 1985); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 50-701-722 (1994); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 14-1207 (1990 & Supp.
1994); MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 93 §§ 50-59, 105 (Law. Co-op. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 31-3-101 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-B:2 to -:21 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.182.005-902 (1994).
102. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-2106 to -2107, 20-2111 to -2112, 20-2119 (1990);
CAL. INS. CODE §§ 791, 791.06 to .07, 791.21 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-
981, -982, -996 (1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-39-1 to 33-39-23 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT
ch. 215, §§ 5-1001 to -1024 (Smith-Hurd 1993); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175 1 §§ 6 -7, 21
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.505 (West 1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-19-101 to -409 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-39-1 to -120 (1994).
103. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1354 (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 13-2-704 to -705
(Michie 1987, Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-90-119 (1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
93 § 106 (Law. Co-op. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. §§ 397.603 to .604, (West 1988),
445.1713 to .1714 (Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 22-1-103 (1993).
104. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-422 (1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-1845 (1981); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 1701-A (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
105. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.1, 1798.63 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540-08
(West 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 35-7-49 (1990); NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-202, 20-204
(1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.12.380 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995).
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Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data." This directive
places special conditions on the transfer of data to nonmember states that
do not adequately protect personal information." United States business-
es stand to lose a great deal of business because this directive was enacted.
This fact, along with the fact that individual privacy and autonomy are
greatly valued by most Americans, necessitates federal legislation that
protects every citizen's right to information privacy.
Some commentators have suggested legislative amendments to
existing federal laws such as the Privacy Act and the Fair Credit Reporting
Act.108 However, amending these pieces of legislation will not provide the
appropriate level of protection to insure against unnecessary dissemination
of personal information. Existing federal legislation already has many
loopholes; these increase the chance that courts would then interpret any
amendments with the same deference the legislation has been given in the
past. More drastic, comprehensive solutions are necessary.
Any legislation enacted must give control over personal information
to the individual. The new legislation should only permit the collection of
information which is needed for the particular situation. For example, loan
and credit card applications should only ask for information that is relevant
and necessary to process that application. Extraneous questions must be
deleted. This does not mean that individuals cannot consent to offer
additional information if they so choose. However, this should be done
only after a full and informed disclosure of the inquirer's intentions and
cannot be a condition of doing business with any organization.
Additionally, restrictions need to be imposed upon the permissible
dissemination of information after it has been collected. Dissemination
should not be allowed without the data subject's consent. Before consent
is given, the individual should be told exactly who will receive the
information and how it will be used. Furthermore, consent forms should
not resemble forms that are commonly used today. Often, insurance
companies use consent forms that never expire and give the same force and
effect to photocopies of the form as to the original form. Therefore,
insurance companies are able to use the same release forms year after year
for as many information disclosures as they deem necessary simply by
having the individual sign one release. This allows insurance companies
106. Council Directive of 24 July 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data. (copy on file
with the Federal Communications Law Journal).
107. Id. at art. 26(1).
108. Graham, supra note 29, at 1423. Amending the Privacy Act was also suggested by
Rep. Robert Wise (D-W. Va.) in H.R. 685, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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and others who follow the same practice to access information that the data
subject might not have consented to if these companies were required to
obtain a new consent form each time information is requested. Alterna-
tively, consent forms should expire after one year. Current practices allow
these organizations to access information for years after the data subject has
signed the form, possibly obtaining information even after the data subject
terminates the use of the company's services.
Further restrictions should be implemented regarding the time period
that information can be retained on an individual. Because it is often
cheaper for organizations to keep information than to dispose of it, the
tendency has been to continue to disseminate old data about individuals.
This practice encourages reliance on information that is outdated and often
no longer an accurate indication of the individual it describes. Congress
needs to impose regulations on collectors of data that require all informa-
tion that is kept on an individual to be disposed of after a specified number
of years. The specific number of years should vary depending on the
information at issue. For instance, typical credit information such as
payment history and amount of debt should be restricted to a retention
period of five years, while information regarding bankruptcy or criminal
embezzlement charges would have a longer retention period. This allows
individuals who have made mistakes in the past to correct these mistakes
instead of being continually haunted by them.
Finally, Congress needs to implement stiff penalties for violation of
the legislation it enacts. Compensatory and punitive damages should be
imposed for collection of unnecessary information, nonconsensual
dissemination, dissemination of outdated and inaccurate information, and
dissemination of purposefully falisfied information. Monetary penalties will
be most effective, because individuals and organizations in the information
brokerage business sell personal information for profit. Therefore, the only
way to curb abuses is to make unscrupulous business practices unprofitable.
By enacting legislation, Congress would set a minimum standard of
conduct for information brokers. The courts would then fine tune the
details. This will be especially necessary if individuals are able to contract
away their rights to information privacy.1°9 A statutory minimum amount
of protection and a recognition of the individual's ability to contractually
waive these rights will result in more informed, better educated consumers.
Consumers will finally understand the pervasiveness of the collection and
dissemination of personal information. Furthermore, this solution would put
the power over personal information into the hands of the individual to
109. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
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whom it pertains instead of in the hands of powerful information brokers.
Allowing individuals to contract away their legislatively given rights will
permit those individuals who are "flattered" by the attention they receive
from unsolicited business to continue to receive this information. It will
also allow individuals who may be interested in receiving only certain types
of information to contract to receive the information in which they are
interested. Most important, this solution accommodates those individuals
who would rather be left alone, sacrificing their privacy only when they
choose to do so and on their own terms.
CONCLUSION
The legal community has paid little attention to the threat to individual
privacy posed by modem computer technology. Recognition of the threat
posed by the uncontrolled dissemination of personal information is an idea
whose time has come. If information is allowed to be freely traded, the
threat to personal autonomy is imminent. Individuals will begin to conform
with what they believe to be societal norms. Societal conformity on such
a grand scale will have untold detrimental effects on the cherished values
of individuality and freedom upon which the United States was founded.
[A person] who is compelled to live every minute of ... life
among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or
gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of
... individuality and human dignity. Such an individual merges
with the mass. His opinions, being public .... tend always to be
conventionally accepted ones; ... feelings, being openly
exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique personal warmth
and to become the feelings of every [person]. Such a being,
although sentient, is fungible, [and] is not an individual. 110
A democratic society has a duty to "foster the moral autonomy of
citizens so they have the ability, the will, and the freedom to make valid
decisions... 1 Additionally, human dignity and individuality need to be
recognized as substantive personal interests, the violation of which are
compensable. Once this is accomplished, the next step-protection of
individual privacy and, thus, information privacy-should follow as the
only natural solution.
110. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1003 (1964).
111. Graham, supra note 29, at 1411.
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